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GETTING DEFENSIVE ABOUT POLICE
NEGLIGENCE: THE HILL PRINCIPLE, THE
HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998 AND THE HOUSE
OF LORDS
CLAIRE MCIVOR*
I. INTRODUCTION
As far as negligence liability is concerned, the English courts have
always been very protective of the police. Following the seminal House
of Lords decision in Hill v. Chief Constable of West Yorkshire,1 their
standard response to any allegation of police negligence – no matter
how loosely related to the investigation or prevention of crime – is to
pull out the policy card, and to use a simple defensive practice argu-
ment to deny the existence of a duty of care. Whether the defensive
practice argument has ever been a convincing one in the context of the
police function is a matter for debate. There is at least some evidence to
suggest that, at the time of theHill decision in the late 1980s, the courts
tended to adopt a rather rose-tinted view of the British police force; a
view which, in light of failings highlighted by recent public inquiries,2
would now be subject to direct challenge.3 More importantly, the
validity of the argument is increasingly being tested by the diverse
range of contexts in which it is now being called into use, in terms of
both the precise nature of the allegation of police negligence being
made, and the specific aspect of the multifaceted police function being
targeted. For although it was conceived as a tool to protect the police
from indeterminate claims brought the public at large for harm in-
flicted by the criminal conduct of third parties, it is now being stretched
to cover claims brought by claimants who were not merely foreseeable
victims, but also have some further special status (e.g. as a prosecution
witness) and even claims which allege positive police misfeasance.
A further challenge to the practice of using this type of policy reasoning
to justify the imposition of a de facto immunity is the increasing use
being made of the alternative cause of action against public authorities
created by the Human Rights Act 1998 (hereafter “HRA”).
* University of Birmingham. I would like to thank Ken Oliphant, Hanna Wilberg and John Bell for
their very helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.
1 [1989] A.C. 53.
2 See especially text accompanying note 28 below (MacPherson Inquiry).
3 Note the recognition of this point by Lord Steyn in Brooks v Commissioner of Police: “[n]owadays a
more sceptical approach to the carrying out of all public functions is necessary” [2005] 1 W.L.R.
1495 at [28].
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The tenability of this police immunity principle requires urgent
reassessment. A perfect opportunity to carry out such a reassessment
was recently provided to the House of Lords by the conjoined appeals
in Chief Constable of Hertfordshire Police v. Van Colle and Smith (FC)
v. Chief Constable of Sussex Police.4 Both cases directly concerned the
applicability of the so-called “Hill principle” which they raised in the
context of claims both in common law negligence (Smith) and under
the HRA (Van Colle). Regrettably, though perhaps not surprisingly,
the House of Lords declined to make use of the opportunity. With the
exception of Lord Bingham (who delivered a partially dissenting
speech), the presiding Law Lords refused to engage in any kind of
critical evaluation of the principle, choosing instead to bluntly uphold
its validity. However there were clear echoes of doubt in at least three
of the majority speeches, and the tone of each of the speeches was
distinctly defensive. It cannot have escaped the awareness of their
Lordships that the traditional justification for the Hill immunity has
been ringing hollow for quite some time now.
The main problem with the English legal approach to police im-
munity is that it is too broad-brush. While there are strong policy rea-
sons against the imposition of negligence liability in certain contexts,
these contexts are both easily identified and limited in nature. Outside
of these contexts, there is no real reason for treating police defendants
any differently to any other public authority defendant. The ordinary
principles of negligence are perfectly capable of limiting liability to all
but the most meritorious of cases. In terms of defining the proper remit
of the immunity principle, the English courts would benefit from
looking at the approach taken by at least some of their Australian
counterparts. In this respect, the recent judgment delivered by
Campbell J.A. in State of New South Wales v. Tyszak5 will be referred
to as a particularly clear and accurate account of the relevance of Hill.
I. THE HILL IMMUNITY PRINCIPLE
Hill v. Chief Constable of West Yorkshire is known to tort students as
the famous “Yorkshire Ripper” case. It involved an action against the
police brought by the mother of the last victim of a notorious serial
killer (the “Yorkshire Ripper”). The mother alleged that the police had
4 [2008] UKHL 50.
5 [2008] NSWCA 107. It should be noted that Campbell J.A.’s judgment was a minority one in the
sense that the majority (Mason P. and Giles J.A.), while arriving at the same outcome, based its
reasoning on breach issues rather than on the duty of care. Nevertheless, Campbell J.A.’s judgment
was by far the most lengthy (with Mason P. in fact merely agreeing with the short judgment
delivered by Giles J.A.) and, more importantly, the one most frequently cited with approval by
subsequent courts. See, for example, Cumming v. State of NSW [2008] NSWSC 690 at [57] and [58]
per Harrison As.J. and State of NSW v. Spearpoint [2009] NSWCA 233 at [10] per Ipp J.A. and at
[27] per Allsop A.C.J. I am grateful to Harold Luntz for bringing the latter case to my attention.
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been negligent in failing to identify and capture the killer before he had
a chance to murder her daughter. In the preceding five year period, the
Ripper had already killed 12 young women in the Yorkshire area. The
claim failed firstly on the basis that there was insufficient proximity
between the police and the daughter. The police had not had any
personal dealings with her and she had not been singled out at any time
as being more at risk from the killer than any other young female in the
area. Secondly the claim was said to be defeated by the public policy
arguments of defensive practice and diversion of police resources.
The defensive practice argument encapsulates the idea that the
threat of liability will cause individuals who provide valuable services
to the community to begin acting in an excessively cautious manner.
The idea is that these individuals will take extra time and use additional
resources in an attempt to eliminate even the most unlikely risks,
adopting what may be colloquially described as an unnecessarily
wasteful “belt and braces” approach to the performance of their tasks,
and that this will impact detrimentally on the provision of the valuable
service. Thus the entire community will suffer as a result. Such argu-
ments tend to be wholly conjectural.6 Certainly, the House of Lords in
Hill did not refer to any actual evidence in support of the applicability
of the defensive practice argument to the police function. Quite
evidently, it may just as easily be argued that the threat of liability will
produce exactly the opposite effect, in that it will motivate individuals
to do their jobs better and therefore result in improved levels of service
for the community. Giving the lead speech of the House in Hill, Lord
Keith acknowledged this possibility but rejected it on the basis that
“[t]he general sense of public duty which motivates police forces is un-
likely to be appreciably reinforced by the imposition of such liability
so far as concerns their function in the investigation and suppression
of crime. From time to time they make mistakes in the exercise of
that function, but it is not to be doubted that they apply their best
endeavours to the performance of it.”7 As indicated already, history has
since revealed that Lord Keith’s faith in the general benevolence of the
police was, at best, overly optimistic.
The diversion of resources argument is perhaps more tenable in
that it is at least objectively verifiable. For it is obvious that it costs
both time and money to defend any legal action. And where police
defendants are concerned, this will involve the depletion of already
limited public funds. However, this argument is generally applicable to
6 Indeed, as pointed out by Burton, in the context of the policing of domestic violence cases at least,
the available empirical evidence would tend to undermine, rather than lend support to, the idea
that the police will provide better victim protection if they are protected from civil liability. See
M Burton, “Failing to Protect: Victims’ Rights and Police Liability” (2009) 72 M.L.R. 283.
7 [1989] A.C. 53 at 63.
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all public body defendants and in practice it appears to have carried
little general weight. It is certainly not common practice for it to feature
as a central defence argument. As the recent decisions in bothVan Colle
and Smith demonstrate, the Hill public policy immunity principle has
come to be associated almost exclusively with the defensive practice
argument.
II. THE HOUSE OF LORDS DECISION IN CHIEF CONSTABLE OF
HERTFORDSHIRE POLICE. VAN COLLE
The facts of Van Colle are as follows: two days before he was due to
appear in court as a prosecution witness at a theft trial, Giles Van
Colle (“the deceased”) was shot and killed by the man against whom
he had been summonsed to give evidence (“the accused”). In the
months leading up to the murder, the deceased had been the victim of a
campaign of intimidation at the hands of the accused. Although each
individual incident had been reported to the police, DC Ridley, the
officer in charge of the case, had failed to identify that the deceased was
at risk of serious harm from the accused and thus had taken no steps to
try to protect him.
Following the accused’s conviction for murder, the deceased’s
parents made a formal complaint to the Police Complaints Authority
about DC Ridley’s handling of the case. Their complaint was upheld
and DC Ridley was subsequently found guilty by a disciplinary
panel of failing to perform his duties conscientiously and diligently in
connection with intimidation by the accused of both the deceased and
another prosecution witness. On the basis of his vicarious liability for
the acts and omissions of his officers, the deceased’s parents then
brought an action under s. 7 of the Human Rights Act against the Chief
Constable of Hertfordshire, alleging a breach by DC Ridley of his
s. 6(1) duty to act compatibly with the deceased’s rights under Articles
2 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
Following a full trial in the High Court, Cox J. allowed the claim.
She held that, on the authority of Osman v. UK,8 the state’s positive
obligation under Article 2 to protect life included a positive obligation
in certain circumstances to take preventative, operational measures to
protect an identified individual whose life was at risk as a result of the
criminal acts of a third party. As set down by the European Court of
Human Rights in Osman, the obligation arose where it was established
that the state authorities knew or ought to have known at the time of
the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of that individual.
She found that, on the evidence, DC Ridley knew or ought to have
8 (1998) 29 E.H.R.R. 245.
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known that the deceased was at special and distinctive risk of harm
from the accused. In arriving at this conclusion on duty, she relied
heavily on dicta from the Court of Appeal decision in R. (A) v. Lord
Saville of Newdigate,9 to the effect that where the state contributes
to the risk of harm to life by requiring an individual to appear as a
witness, the Osman test of knowledge of a real and immediate risk to
life is lowered and thus easier to satisfy. In holding that DC Ridley
had committed a breach of that duty by failing to take appropriate
measures reasonably available to him to obviate the risk to life, she
relied on the findings of the disciplinary panel. Causation was duly
established by evidence that the protective measures available would
have had a real prospect of altering the outcome and avoiding the
death. Cox J. awarded damages in the total sum of £50,000, made up of
£15,000 to the deceased’s estate in respect of the distress he suffered in
the weeks leading up to his death and £35,000 to his parents in respect
of their own grief and suffering.
On appeal, the Chief Constable challenged the judge’s decisions
on both liability and quantum. He argued that, on the facts as pleaded,
a duty had neither been owed nor breached and that the wrong test for
causation had been applied. In accordance with the ordinary common
law approach to causation, he argued that it was necessary to show
that “but for” the infringement of Article 2 the deceased would have
survived. On the question of quantum, the Chief Constable submitted
that the judge’s award was too high. The Court of Appeal allowed the
appeal in part. While it upheld the findings of the judge on liability,
it found that the amount of damages awarded was excessive in the
circumstances and it accordingly reduced the award from £50,000 to
£25,000 (made up of £10,000 to the deceased’s estate and £7,500 each to
the claimants, the deceased’s parents).
On appeal to the House of Lords, the Chief Constable focussed on
the finding of a duty. Relying primarily on dicta of Lord Carswell in
In re Officer L,10 he argued that the threshold of the Osman test of
knowledge of a real and immediate risk to life was very high and was
not variable in accordance with the type of situation in question. As
such, he contended that both the High Court and the Court of Appeal
9 [2001] 1 W.L.R. 1249. Often referred to as the “Widgery Soldiers” case, the Court of Appeal in
Newdigate held that the Bloody Sunday Inquiry Tribunal had a positive duty under Article 2 to
take reasonable steps to protect the lives of its soldier witnesses from real and immediate dissident
republican threat. In the circumstances, this involved allowing the soldiers to provide their evidence
via a video link from a venue on the British mainland, rather than in person in Northern Ireland.
10 [2007] UKHL 36. This case involved an application for anonymity by police officers called to give
evidence before the Robert Hamill Inquiry in Northern Ireland. The House of Lords held that the
correct test for determining an entitlement to anonymity in this case was whether the pre-existing
risk of death would be increased if the officers were required to give evidence without anonymity.
On the basis that there was no evidence of an increased risk in this case, the Article 2 obligations of
the tribunal did not require a granting of anonymity.
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had erred in finding that the deceased’s role as a witness had endowed
him with a special status which justified the lowering of the standard
Osman test. Accepting this contention, the House of Lords unan-
imously allowed the appeal in Van Colle. Designating the Newdigate
decision as one confined to its own facts, Lords Bingham, Hope,
Phillips, Carswell and Brown all agreed that the Osman test was a
constant, to be applied whatever the particular circumstances of the
case. The high threshold had not been met in this case, where the
warning signs were even less clear and obvious than those in Osman,
which had themselves been found inadequate to meet the test. DC
Ridley could not have been expected to have anticipated that a minor
case of theft, followed by a catalogue of fairly trivial incidents of
possible intimidation, would result in a brutal murder.
III. THE HOUSE OF LORDS DECISION IN SMITH (FC) V. CHIEF
CONSTABLE OF SUSSEX POLICE
The claimant in Smith was threatened with extreme violence over a
period of months by his ex-partner, after having ended their relation-
ship. He had repeatedly told the police about the threats, the majority
of which had been sent as text messages, and had given the police both
the name and address of the ex-partner, as well as the mobile number
from which the relevant text messages had been sent. Despite having
ample evidence and information to arrest the ex-partner, the police
failed to do so. The ex-partner subsequently attacked the claimant with
a claw hammer leaving him with serious and permanent injuries, and
was later convicted of making threats to kill and causing grievous
bodily harm with intent.
Out of time for suing for a breach of his Convention rights under
the HRA (for which the limitation period is a mere 12 months11), the
claimant brought an action in negligence against the police for failing
to protect him in the circumstances. On the application of the police,
the claim was struck out at first instance as having no real prospect of
success on two grounds. Simpkiss J. held that there was no sufficient
relationship of proximity between the claimant and the police and that
in any event, following the decision in Hill, public policy militated
against the imposition of a duty of care in this situation. On appeal, the
Court of Appeal reversed the decision of Simpkiss J., holding that
the claim was not doomed to failure and that it should be allowed to
proceed to trial. Sedley, Rimer and Pill L.JJ. were all of the opinion
that the facts of Smith were potentially distinguishable from both Hill
and the House of Lords decision in Brooks v. Commissioner of Police
(no duty of care to victim of racist attack who was initially treated as a
11 Section 7(6).
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suspect in his friend’s murder in the same incident).12 In the words of
Sedley L.J., the facts of Smith were far starker than the assumed facts
of Brooks while, in contrast to the claimant in Hill, Smith’s claim
did not depend on his status as a member of the public facing a risk
common to many others.13 Placing great emphasis on Osman v. UK,
Sedley L.J. went on to say that the degree of proximity between the
parties could be used to overcome the public policy considerations
which would otherwise bar the claim and to create a duty of care. In his
view, a very clear example of a similar approach was provided by the
decision in Swinney v. Chief Constable of Northumbria,14 in which
the Court of Appeal was prepared to recognise that a duty could
be owed by the police to protect an informant whose identity they
had negligently disclosed. The public interest in the protection of
informants was to be regarded as outweighing the public interest in
protecting the police from liability as regards their performance of
their duties. In this respect, he could see no valid ground of distinction
between witnesses and informers.15 The decision in Swinney thus pro-
vided a powerful justification for dismissing the strike-out application
and allowing the claim to be determined at full trial.
Reversing the decision of the Court of Appeal, a 4 to 1 majority of
the House of Lords (Lord Bingham dissenting) held that the claim
in Smith was defeated by the defensive practice argument enshrined
in Hill.16 Cautioning against any retreat from Hill, their Lordships
adopted a blunt utilitarian rationale and argued that the interests of the
wider community had to be prioritised over those of the individual.17
Rejecting any argument that Hill had to be qualified in light of
subsequent developments in the law, most notably the decision in
Osman, they placed great reliance on the decision in Brooks and treated
the “core principle” of Hill as having remained intact. Addressing the
relevance of Swinney, Lord Hope presented it as falling outside the
“core principle” as it was (in his view) not concerned with the police
function of investigating and suppressing crime in the public interest,18
while Lord Brown presented it as an exceptional decision based on
evidence of an assumption of responsibility.
12 [2005] 1 W.L.R. 1495. This decision is discussed in more detail on pp. 141–142.
13 [2008] EWCA Civ 39 at [12].
14 [1997] Q.B. 464.
15 [2008] EWCA Civ 39 at [29] per Sedley LJ.
16 [2008] UKHL 50 at [76] and [78] per Lord Hope, at [97] per Lord Phillips, at [108] per Lord Carswell
and at [132] per Lord Brown. Lord Phillips also mentions the diversion of resources issue (at [89]),
but fails to develop it any further.
17 Ibid at [75] per Lord Hope, at [106] per Lord Carswell and at [139] per Lord Brown. Lord Phillips
expressed himself to be in agreement with Lord Hope’s speech.
18 Ibid at [80]. While confirming the general applicability of the Hill immunity principle in the police
context, Lord Steyn in Brooks left open the possibility of it being disapplied in exceptional cases of
“outrageous” police negligence. Unfortunately he declined to provide any examples of such
outrageous scenarios.
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Significantly, however, Lord Phillips admitted that he had arrived
at his decision with some reluctance, being of the opinion that the facts
of Smith came close to constituting the kind of “outrageous negligence”
that Lord Steyn had contemplated in Brooks as being outside the remit
of the Hill principle.19 He further commented that the difficult issues of
policy raised by Smith were a matter for Parliament to resolve rather
than the courts,20 thereby arguably implicitly acknowledging that the
current legal position was in need of redress. Similarly, Lord Carswell
was “unable to escape some feeling of concern” in applying the “core
principle” to the facts of Smith, acknowledging that Smith “tested the
principle severely”,21 while Lord Brown admitted that his decision was
“not without hesitation”.22 He acknowledged that the facts of Smith
were “really very strong”23 and “vastly different from those either in
Hill or in Brooks” and that it would be “easier to contemplate liability
here than in either of those cases.”24
The doubts expressed by their Lordships were undoubtedly influ-
enced by the powerful dissenting speech delivered by Lord Bingham.
He alone would have recognised the existence of a duty based on what
he termed “the liability principle”, according to which: “if a member of
the public (A) furnishes a police officer (B) with apparently credible
evidence that a third party whose identity and whereabouts are known
presents a specific and imminent threat to his life or physical safety,
B owes A a duty to take reasonable steps to assess such threat and, if
appropriate, take reasonable steps to prevent it being executed.”25 On
the facts of Smith, this principle was easily satisfied by the fact that the
claimant had furnished the police with strong evidence of threats from
an identified third party, and that as between the claimant and the
police there was a strong relationship of close proximity created by
numerous face-to-face meetings with evidence of an assumption of re-
sponsibility. Having correctly identified the remit of the so-called “core
principle”, Lord Bingham did not regard his liability principle as being
inconsistent with either Hill or Brooks. Crucially, he was dismissive of
the defensive practice argument as applied by the majority, rightly
pointing out that all that the liability principle would call for in the first
instance would be a reasonable assessment of a very specific threat.26
Indeed, the principle would only ever come into play in very limited
scenarios.
19 Ibid at [101].
20 Ibid at [102]
21 Ibid at [107].
22 Ibid at [127].
23 Ibid at [125].
24 Ibid at [124].
25 Ibid at [44].
26 Ibid at [49] and [52].
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IV. THE HILL PRINCIPLE AND THE COMMON LAW ACTION
IN NEGLIGENCE
The decision of the House of Lords in Smith highlights two main
problems with the current judicial approach to the application of the
Hill principle: (1) a lack of understanding as to its nature and ambit;
and (2) the tenuousness of the defensive practice argument as the sole
justification for the imposition of a de facto immunity. I have already
discussed both problems at length elsewhere and do not propose to
recite the same arguments in detail here.27 Suffice to say that the current
major obstacle to the proper interpretation of Hill lies in the House of
Lords decision in Brooks. This is keenly demonstrated by Smith, in
which even Lord Bingham, who was otherwise very sympathetic to the
argument that there should be a retreat from the immunity principle,
wholly misrepresented the relevance of the Brooks decision.
As mentioned briefly above, Brooks involved a negligence action
against the police for alleged mistreatment of a witness to a murder
resulting in psychiatric harm. The incident had been investigated by an
independent body as part of a wider public inquiry into the murder and
the findings of the inquiry were damning in the extreme.28 Crucially for
Mr Brooks, the police were found to have treated him in an improper
and racially discriminatory manner. Despite such strong evidence of
negligently unreasonable behaviour, the House of Lords dismissed
the action for lack of duty, relying directly on the Hill ratio. However,
the presiding Law Lords (Lords Bingham, Nicholls, Steyn, Rodger and
Brown) failed to take into account the fact that the ratio of Hill stem-
med from a third party liability action against the police and that its
statements on proximity and public policy were specific to that context.
Third party liability, whereby one party is held responsible for
failing to control the conduct of a third party harm-doer, may be
regarded as a form of omissions liability. While the English courts are
hostile to omissions liability generally, they are even more hostile to
this particular subset of such liability, for it involves imposing liability
on the wrong party. In third party liability cases, there is always going
to be someone more obviously to blame than the defendant, and that is
the actual harm-doer. Long before Hill, the courts had put into place
special restrictive rules on the existence of affirmative third party duties
to control. InHome Office v.Dorset Yacht,29 the House of Lords set out
27 See C. McIvor, “Police Immunity and the Legacy of Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire”
(2005) 21 Professional Negligence 201 and C. McIvor, “The negligence liability of child welfare
authorities and policy-based immunities: A critique of recent English developments” (2006)
14 Torts Law Journal 205.
28 The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry: Report of An Inquiry by Sir Macpherson of Cluny (1999;
Cm. 4262-I).
29 [1970] A.C. 1004.
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that in addition to two relationships of close proximity (one as between
the defendant and the victim, and another as between the defendant
and the harm-doer), the conduct of the harm-doer resulting in damage
to the victim must have been highly foreseeable in the circumstances.
Where these special requirements are not satisfied, as they were not in
Hill, then various legal and policy reasons militate against the impo-
sition of a duty, of which a defensive practice argument is but one. For
instance, where the potential class of victims covers the public at large,
then a genuine floodgates concern most obviously comes in to play.
As a case involving a straightforward misfeasance, Brooks should
not have been dealt with under the Hill principle. There were strong
reasons for imposing a duty based on the standard Caparo principles of
foreseeability, proximity and fair, just and reasonableness, with the
decision in Swinney providing a particularly compelling analogy.
Nevertheless, the House of Lords in Brooks decided that the Hill
principle covered all negligence actions against the police in respect of
their duties in investigating and suppressing crime. As will be discussed
below, this labelling of a police duty as being concerned with the in-
vestigation and suppression of crime is much too broad and imprecise.
Until Brooks is challenged, there is little chance of the Hill principle
being properly understood and implemented. It is very discouraging in
this respect that even Lord Bingham in his speech in Smith got Brooks
completely wrong. In arguing that his “liability principle” did not
challenge the authority of Brooks, he presented Brooks as being a third
party liability case similar to Hill and justified the dismissal of the
action on the basis that it involved neither an identified suspect
nor evidence of any threat at all to the life or physical safety of the
claimant.30 Somewhat bizarrely, Lord Bingham described the pleaded
case as being that, whilst the attackers remained at large, Duwayne
Brooks was frightened for his own safety, not least because he lived in
the same locality.31 While it may indeed have been true that Mr. Brooks
feared reprisals from the attackers, this did not form the basis of his
claim in negligence against the police. It was predicated purely on the
active conduct of the police in treating him as a suspect to the crime
rather than as a victim and a witness.
V. LESSONS FROM AUSTRALIA
While it cannot be said that the Australian courts have actually rejected
the Hill principle,32 they have at least shown themselves to be much
30 [2008] UKHL 50 at [47].
31 Ibid at [48].
32 See, for example, Cran v. State of New South Wales (2004) 62 NSWLR 95 (CA).
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more measured in their application of it,33 and their rules on public
authority liability generally are much more defensible as a result.34
As mentioned earlier, useful reference may be made to, the recent
judgment of Campbell J.A. in State of NSW v. Tyszyk. In this case, two
police officers were sued for failing to protect a member of the public
from the risk of personal injury posed by a dangling downpipe. The
officers were present at the scene having responded to a telephone
call from a passerby reporting the danger. Shortly after they arrived
however, and before they implemented any precautions in relation to
the downpipe, a tree fell across a nearby road and blocked the
thoroughfare. While the officers were attempting to move the tree, the
claimant pulled up in his vehicle and parked underneath the loose pipe.
Upon alighting from his car, the pipe fell and struck him on the
shoulder. In response to the defence argument that the police were
under no duty of care in accordance with Hill on the basis that they
were engaged in an investigation at the relevant time, Campbell J.A.
stated that Hill was not an authority that there was immunity from
liability in negligence for police officers in all circumstances.35 He
explained further: “It seems to me that the principle that Hill stands
for is that, when there is a criminal at large who has demonstrated a
propensity to commit crimes against a particular group of people, and
that group of people is a large one, police owe no duty to of care to
persons who might become a victim of that criminal, concerning the
strategies adopted and resources to be employed in seeking to identify
and arrest that criminal.”36
He thus found that the defendants in Tyszyk could not benefit from
Hill immunity. Nevertheless, he avoided their liability on alternative
grounds which were not only simpler but entirely more convincing.
Essentially, he held that as the officers had not contributed to the risk
of harm, so that all they could be accused of in the circumstances was a
pure omission, then in accordance with the ordinary rules governing
omissions liability, it was necessary to show that they had entered into
some kind of special relationship with the victim before an affirmative
duty could be said to arise. In this case, there was nothing in the
33 See P Marshall, “Police liability in negligence: The application of the Hill immunity in Australia”
(2007) 15 Torts Law Journal 3.
34 For instance, the “inconsistent duties doctrine” set out by the High Court in Sullivan v. Moody
(2001) 207 C.L.R. 562 may be regarded as a more sophisticated version of the “fair, just and
reasonable” test applied by the English courts. Although the High Court in Sullivan v. Moody
appeared to approve of theHill principle, it must be made clear that it approved only of the practice
of using policy arguments to confer limited immunity. As such it relied partly on Hill to deny the
existence of a duty on child welfare professionals towards persons accused of committing child
abuse. It did not approve specifically of the defensive practice argument and it did not endorse the
use of the Hill principle to confer a blanket immunity on the police.
35 [2008] NSWCA 107 at [121].
36 Ibid at [123].
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relationship between the officers and the victim which placed the victim
in a different situation to that of any other member of the public who
was also at the scene at the time.37 The decision in Tyszyk demonstrates
very clearly that it is possible to limit the Hill principle and still protect
the police from liability in certain contexts. Without wishing to state
the obvious, it is perhaps similarly necessary to point out that the
imposition of a duty will not always result in actual liability either, for
breach and causation will still have to be proven.
Campbell J.A.’s judgment in Tyszyk is also important in demon-
strating the significance of the act/omission distinction in the context
of police negligence liability. Indeed the operation of the distinction
explains why a duty of care has in the past been imposed on a police
defendant. Notably, both Knightly v. Johns38 and Rigby v. Chief Con-
stable of Northamptonshire39 involved positive acts on the part of the
police. In the former, a police officer instructed the victim to ride his
motorcycle round a blind bend in a tunnel against the flow of traffic,
while in the latter the police had fired a canister of CS gas into a shop
without ensuring that adequate precautions were in place to put out
any fire that might result. That is not to say that a positive act on the
part of the police causing harm will always result in a duty, for it may
well be the case that the relevant requirement of foreseeability is not
satisfied. It merely means that the existence of a duty is arguable in the
ordinary way. Where, on the other hand, the police are sued for failing
to prevent harm, then an exceptional affirmative duty will not arise
unless there is evidence of a special kind of pre-tort relationship existing
between the police and the victim. The easiest way to establish
the necessary kind of pre-tort relationship is to provide evidence of
an assumption of responsibility on the part of the police towards
the victim. This would require personal dealings between the parties
and evidence that the police had encouraged the victim to rely on
their protection to their detriment. Hence the existence of the duty in
Swinney, where the police led the claimant informant to believe that
they would keep her identity protected. Other pre-tort relationships
will automatically give rise to a duty to protect from foreseeable harm,
such as the relationship between custodian and detainee. Cases such
as Kirkham v. Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police,40 Reeves
v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis41 and Orange v. Chief
Constable of Yorkshire Police42 establish that the duty will even extend
to protecting against the risk of self-harm, at least where the detainees’
37 Ibid at [153].
38 [1982] 1 W.L.R. 349.
39 [1985] 1 W.L.R. 1242.
40 [1990] 2 Q.B. 283.
41 [2000] 1 A.C. 360.
42 [2002] Q.B. 347.
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self-harming tendencies have been brought to the attention of the cus-
todial authority. Here the nature of the affirmative duty being imposed
is entirely compatible with the performance of the custodial function,
and there are no obvious policy arguments against liability.
Hill should no longer be treated as applying to all police conduct
associated with the investigation and suppression of crime. This is what
has made it such an unwieldy tool for controlling police liability, for
such a category can also be made to extend to mundane administrative
tasks. For example, in the Australian case of Tame v. New South
Wales,43 a police officer who was sued for allegedly causing psychiatric
harm to the plaintiff after wrongly recording a blood alcohol reading as
being positive resorted to arguing that he should avoid liability on the
ground that his conduct fell under the rubric of a police investigation.
A less convincing scenario for a defensive practice immunity argument
would be hard to imagine, all the more so because the resort to the
immunity argument was so unnecessary in the circumstances. The
claim was a very weak one and arguably it was always destined to fail.
Although the High Court was able to dismiss it on other grounds, it
could arguably have been dispensed with on the simple basis that the
harm in question was not reasonably foreseeable in the circumstances.
At present, immunity is the starting point for the judicial assessment
of police negligence liability, while the existence of a duty is the
exception. It is argued here that this situation ought to be reversed.
There are too many different versions of the police function and too
many different contexts in which an allegation of negligence may be
raised for there to be blanket rule. There will be policy considerations
relevant to some police functions which may justify a finding of no duty
in certain circumstances, but the relevance of these considerations will
necessarily be very fact-sensitive. As such they will need to be assessed
on a case by case basis, and in accordance with the Osman ruling on
proportionality in relation to the conferral of policy-based immunities,
the policy arguments against the recognition of a duty will need to
be weighed against the arguments in favour. As an entirely untested
argument,44 the defensive practice argument should never be used on its
own to justify police immunity in an individual case.
VI. POLICE IMMUNITY AND THE ACTION UNDER THE HRA FOR BREACH
OF AN ARTICLE 2 POSITIVE DUTY
In Van Colle, the House of Lords made it clear that the police would
rarely be liable under the HRA for failing to protect an individual from
43 (2002) 191 A.L.R. 449.
44 See J. Morgan, “Policy reasoning in tort law: the courts, the Law Commission and the critics”
(2009) 125 L.Q.R. 215.
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the criminal acts of a third party. Determined not to allow all
their efforts with the Hill principle to be undone through the creation
of a backdoor route to compensation, their Lordships deliberately
interpreted the existing HRA and European Court of Human Rights
jurisprudence as restrictively as possible, so as to create a test for police
liability under the HRA which would operate in a similar fashion to its
common law cousin. Thus it is likely that only those claims which
would fall within Lord Steyn’s exceptional category of “outrageous
negligence”, as set out in Brooks, will pass the so-called Osman test of
“knowledge of a real and immediate risk of harm to life”. It will be a
case of double or nothing, and usually nothing. Once again, however, it
is argued that the House of Lords needs to adopt a more refined and
context-specific approach to the determination of this form of police
liability.
It is probably useful to explain briefly the legal basis for the type of
HRA action taken against the police in Van Colle. The HRA, which
came into force in October 2000, was conceived as mechanism for
giving “further effect” to the European Convention on Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms (hereafter ECHR), and to enable some
direct enforcement of certain ECHR rights within the domestic
courts. It is important to recognise that the Act does not make ECHR
rights generally enforceable in domestic law; it merely makes them
directly enforceable against public authorities. Section 6(1) of the HRA
imposes a duty on public authorities to act compatibly with ECHR
rights. Under section 7, an individual whose protected rights are
contravened by a public authority, such as the police, is entitled to
initiate proceedings directly against the authority. Section 8 empowers
the court to provide a remedy in the form of damages. As a public
authority, the police thus fall under the section 6 duty to act compatibly
with individual ECHR rights. The ECHR right in issue in Van Colle
was Article 2, which protects the right to life. Where the police
contravene the Article 2 interests of an individual, they may be said to
have breached their section 6 HRA duty, as a result of which they can
be sued under section 7 HRA.
In protecting the right to life, Article 2 has been interpreted as
imposing a range of different duties on the state and its organs. First
and foremost, it imposes a negative duty to refrain from taking life.
Secondly, however it also imposes a number of what may be termed
“positive duties”, which require the taking of active measures to protect
life, and these may be sub-divided into (1) procedural duties; and
(2) substantive duties. The primary procedural duty imposes on the
state an obligation to carry out an independent public investigation
into any death occurring in circumstances in which it appears that an
individual’s Convention rights have been, or may have been, violated
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and it appears that agents of the state may be in some way implicated,
whether through deliberate act or negligent omission. Usually the in-
vestigation will take the form of an inquest.45 The Article 2 procedural
duty will for example by triggered by the non-natural death of a pris-
oner in custody.46 The category of Article 2 positive substantive duties
must be further subdivided into: (a) a primary duty on the state to
establish an effective system of criminal law to deter those who threaten
life, backed up by law enforcement machinery to prevent and punish its
breaches; (b) secondary duties on individual public bodies such as
hospitals and prisons which are charged with the care of vulnerable
persons to operate appropriate institutional systems and procedures
for protecting life; and (c) specific operational duties on individual
public bodies to take preventative measures to protect an individual
whose life is at risk from the criminal acts of another. It is this latter
operational duty which was the subject of the claim in Van Colle.
The operational duty was first set out by the European Court of
Human Rights in Osman v. UK, which described it as being triggered
by evidence that the relevant authorities knew or ought to have known
at the time of a real and immediate risk to the life of an individual from
the criminal acts of a third party. Once triggered, the duty gives rise to
an obligation to take reasonable measures, within the scope of the
powers of the relevant authority, which might be expected to avoid that
risk, but subject to the following qualification: “… bearing in mind the
difficulties involved in policing modern societies, the unpredictability
of human conduct and the operational choice which must be made
in terms of priorities and resources, such an obligation must be inter-
preted in a way which does not impose an impossible or dispro-
portionate burden on the authorities.”47 Thus the duty is not designed
to be a particularly onerous one and there is certainly scope for a
significant degree of flexibility as regards the manner of its application.
And similarly to the third party negligence liability principle estab-
lished by the Dorset Yacht case, it has a very limited remit in that it will
only be in exceptional scenarios that the authorities will have actual or
constructive knowledge of a specific threat to an identifiable victim
from an identified third party harm-doer.
The English courts should have little to fear from the implemen-
tation into domestic law of the Osman operational duty. Case law
subsequent to Van Colle may perhaps indicate that the wariness of the
courts stems from a failure to appreciate its sphere of applicability. To
45 See R (Middleton) v. West Somerset Coroner and Another [2004] 2 A.C. 182 on the form that an
inquest must take in order to comply with the Article 2 procedural obligation.
46 See, for example, Keenan v. UK (2001) 33 E.H.R.R. 913 and Edwards v. UK (2002) 35 E.H.R.R.
487.
47 (1998) 29 E.H.R.R. 245 at [116].
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be precise, they may be worried that the imposition of such liability on
the police will necessarily lead to a plethora of Article-2-based HRA
claims against various other public authorities, culminating in the
creation of a general public authority duty to actively protect any
individual who comes to their attention as being at risk of serious
harm, either from themselves or at the hands of a third party. For in
recent months, two such claims have reached the House of Lords:
Savage v. South Essex Partnership NHS Foundation Trust48 and
Mitchell v. Glasgow City Council.49 However, it is likely that the
majority of such speculative claims could be easily dismissed on the
basis that the operational Article 2 duty is only applicable to certain
public authority functions, most notably those involving the care and
control of vulnerable individuals. Thus the only bodies likely to be
caught by such liability under the HRA are the police, the prison
service and the NHS, particularly as regards its mental health services.50
This is because their functions are amongst the few that are compatible
with the requirements of the operational duty. Thus the action in
Savage was rightly allowed to proceed to trial, for it was concerned
with the failure of a psychiatric hospital to take reasonable steps to
prevent a compulsorily detained patient from committing suicide.
Moreover, there was direct Strasbourg jurisprudence on this very
kind of duty in the form of the well-known case of Keenan v. UK.51 In
deciding Savage, the House of Lords correctly identified that both the
relationship of protection and control between the parties and the
clear vulnerability of the victim were key to the application of the
operational duty. Nevertheless, when the case ofMitchell came along, a
slightly differently composed House failed to distinguish it on these
obvious grounds. Mitchell involved a HRA action against a housing
authority for failing to protect one of its tenants from serious harm at
the hands of another tenant. The House of Lords should have simply
dismissed the claim outright by declaring that the Osman operational
duty was inapplicable to the facts on the basis that it was entirely
incompatible with the public purpose and function of a housing auth-
ority, and with the nature of the relationship which exists between a
landlord and tenant. However, Lord Rodger was the only member of
48 [2009] 2 W.L.R. 115. See further N Allen, “Saving Life and Respecting death: A Savage Dilemma”
(2009) Medical Law Review 262.
49 [2009] 2 W.L.R. 481.
50 Other recent Article 2 cases have involved judicial review applications, as opposed to actions for
damages. See, for example, R (A) v. Lord Saville of Newdigate, Ex p A [2002] 1 W.L.R. 1249 and
In re Officer L and others [2007] UKHL 36.
51 (2001) 33 E.H.R.R. 913. The application in this case was brought by the mother of a mentally-ill
man who committed suicide while in prison. While the European Court of Human Rights held that
the prison authority in question had a positive duty under Article 2 to protect the life of the
deceased, it found that the conduct of the authority had been reasonable in the circumstances and
that therefore the duty had not been breached.
148 The Cambridge Law Journal [2010]
the panel to even touch on either of these issues. The others simply went
through the motions of applying the Osman test before ultimately
avoiding liability on the basis of an entirely unconvincing conclusion
that the requirement of knowledge of a real and immediate risk had not
been satisfied. On the facts, there was very strong evidence of direct
knowledge of the risk posed to the victim by the other tenant.52
In short, there was no need for the House of Lords in Van Colle to
fix the threshold for theOsman test of knowledge of real and immediate
risk at such a high level. Although the operational duty is readily
applicable to the police function, it will only ever be triggered by
knowledge of a specific serious threat to a named individual, and it
will only ever require the taking of reasonable steps to assess the threat
and provide appropriate protection. And if the remit of the Article 2
operational duty is properly clarified by the House of Lords, then there
would be no reason to fear an influx of HRA claims against other
public authorities for failing to protect life.
VII. SHOULD THE COMMON LAW DEVELOP IN HARMONY WITH THE
HUMAN RIGHTS ACT?
A broader issue thrown squarely into focus by the Van Colle and Smith
decisions is the nature of the relationship between the common law
action in negligence and the new statutory action for breach of ECHR
rights under the HRA.53 For if the conclusion is reached that the two
ought to develop in harmony, then the decision in Smith is rendered all
the more dubious. However, it is an issue on which opinion is currently
divided, as demonstrated all too clearly by the contrasting approaches
adopted in this respect by the Court of Appeal and the House of
Lords in Smith. For while Sedley, Rimer and Pill L.JJ. were resolutely
pro-harmonisation, as was Lord Bingham, Lords Hope, Phillips,
Carswell and Brown were resolutely separatist.
Nevertheless, the fact that the English courts, as public authorities
for the purposes of the HRA, are themselves subject to the section 6
duty not to act incompatibly with ECHR rights, which translates into a
duty to develop the law in a manner that is consistent with such rights,
may be cited as a very strong argument in favour of harmonisation.
Moreover further support may be drawn from the decisions of both the
Court of Appeal and the House of Lords in D v. East Berkshire
Community Health NHS Trust,54 in which, specifically in anticipation of
52 Eye-witnesses had previously informed the authority on various occasions that the tenant in
question had been aggressive towards the victim, and had even issued him with death threats.
53 See further, J. Steele’s very thought-provoking discussion of some of wider unresolved issues raised
by the interaction of the two causes of action: “Damages in tort and under the Human Rights Act:
remedial or functional separation?” [2008] C.L.J. 606.
54 [2004] Q.B. 558, [2005] 2 A.C. 373 (HL).
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the imminent coming into force of the HRA, the seminal House of
Lords decision in X v. Bedfordshire County Council55 was partially
overruled so as to ensure better protection of the ECHR rights of child
claimants suing in negligence in respect of child protection decisions.
Given the difficult history of public authority negligence liability, and
in particular, the strength of disagreement invoked by the European
Court of Human Rights decisions in both Osman and Z v. UK56 it is
unlikely that a consensus on the question of the relationship between
the common law action in negligence and the new HRA action will
be reached any time soon. It is however an important matter which
warrants immediate attention and it is hoped that the decisions in
Van Colle and Smith will at least compel the necessary full and open
debate.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The English legal approach to police negligence liability continues to be
excessively restrictive. The Hill immunity principle has been stretched
too far, and its foundations are wearing increasingly thin. The time
has now come to abandon it completely. Immunity should not be the
default position in all claims against the police in negligence. While
some aspects of the police function will require legal protection, this
protection must be tailored to context, and if policy arguments are
employed they must be fact-sensitive. For all other claims against
the police, the ordinary rules of negligence are more than capable of
limiting liability to all but the most deserving of cases. The existence of
an alternative route to liability through the HRA, albeit one that
has been strictly narrowed by an anxious House of Lords, renders
the current common law position all the more precarious. The days of
the immunity principle are numbered. It can only be hoped that its
demise comes sooner rather than later.
55 [1995] 2 A.C. 633.
56 [2002] 3E E.H.R.R. 3. In Z, the European Court of Human Rights denied that the UK courts had
applied a blanket immunity in dismissing the claims in X v. Bedfordshire. The decision has been
interpreted both as a retreat from Osman and as a consistent application of Osman: see, for
example, C. Gearty, “Osman Unravels” (2002) 65 M.L.R 87 and C. McIvor, Third Party Liability
in Tort (Oxford, 2006) at pp. 115–118.
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